In the European tradition, religious violence has manifested itself principally in the guise of three phenomena, martyrdom, holy war, and terror. While this labeling is unproblematic for holy war (inclusive of crusades and confessional wars of religion), that martyrs perpetrate a form of violence and that there inheres a religious component in terror may seem self-evident only to recent observers of very recent history. Without denying the importance of conjuncture and (perhaps) pathology in the occurrences of these phenomena, it is legitimate to try to recover how they made deep sense over the very longue durée of Western history, even across the classic divide separating premodern and «religious» from modern and «secular», across the temporal plane within which theologies morphed into godless ideologies. More precisely, how did these phenomena make deep sense given a theology that has often been labeled pacifist?2 «Given» has often been translated «despite», the presumption being that an essentially pacifist early Christian ethos was perverted by outside forces – to round up the usual suspects, Constantine’s conversion; the warlike barbarian invaders; feudalism; state-building.3 Obviously it would be a difficult proposition to brush away these factors in a longue-durée history of violence in the Christian world. But «given» can

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1 This paper was read at the Yale Whitney Center for the Humanities, Yale, and at a British Academy Network meeting in Bergen (Norway), and discussed at Stanford. My thanks to audiences for comments, in particular to Claudia Brosseder, Adam Kosto, Piotr Gorecki, Robert Post, Jennifer Summit, and Björn Weiler. I want to acknowledge here the support of the British Academy Network «Political Culture in Norman and Angevin England in Comparative Perspective» and of the ACLS, whose 2005-2006 fellowship grant allowed me to conduct the research that underpins this article. It is a contribution to a larger research endeavor, meant to culminate in a book tentatively entitled Genealogies of religious violence: Martyrdom, terror and holy war in the West, ca. 70 to ca. 2001 C.E.


also be rendered «in terms of». The question then becomes: How did martyrdom, holy war, and terror make deep sense in the terms of a theology that has often been labeled pacifist? Being as vast as it is, the issue cannot be fully explored within the scope of this paper, and certainly not for all three phenomena. We shall limit ourselves here to some suggestions concerning holy war. Through a comparison of the eleventh-century Church reform and the French Revolution, with side references to America’s wars and to early modern religious conflicts, we will also try to allude to the longue-durée impact of the theological conceptions of war, as theological culture mutated itself into ideologies.

When scholars do not look to forces located outside Christianity and the Christian Churches for some contaminating agents perverting Christianity’s original pacifist essence, they can still see in religious violence a religious deviation. Schmuel Eisenstadt recently proposed that violent fundamentalisms and Jacobin-style revolutions worldwide are historically related to the heresies that the great axial religions systemically produce. His thesis refines and extends to a global scope a classic paradigm in the historical sociology of Christianity. Over the past two centuries, intellectuals have regularly posited a connection between heresies and revolution. Contemporaries often themselves drew such a connection, if seldom approvingly.

But the notion of heresy as the matrix of religious violence may confuse as much as enlighten. Might one not in fact suggest that if axial religions systemically produce heresy — through a mechanism explored by Eisenstadt himself and by Marcel Gauchet — then heretical violence is not fundamentally alien to them? In the history of Christianity, a heretical notion is more often than not an emphasis or component in the paradoxical dialectic consti-

4 The insight of Carl Schmitt remains valid, and valid beyond the sphere of political science narrowly conceived: «Alle prägnanten Begriffe der modernen Staatslehre sind säkularisierte theologische Begriffe. Nicht nur ihrer historischen Entwicklung nach, weil sie aus der Theologie auf der Staatslehre übertragen wurde, sondern auch in ihrer systematischen Struktur, deren Erkenntnis notwendig ist für eine soziologische Betrachtung dieser Begriffe»: Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, Duncker & Humblot, Munich 1922, p. 43.


6 There is thus a continuum between, on the one hand, the polemics-driven model of similarity structured political and religious societies developed by the Catholic monarchist Louis, vicomte de Bonald, and, on the other hand, the systematic correlation posited by the sociologist Guy E. Swanson, Religion and regime. A sociological analysis of the Reformation, U. of Michigan P., Ann Arbor 1967. See Philippe Buc, The Dangers of Ritual. Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory, Princeton U.P., Princeton 2001, pp. 206ff. For a panorama of more mundane pairings of revolutionary and heretic from the nineteenth century on, see Jeffrey B. Russell, Interpretations of the Origin of Medieval Heresy, in «Mediaeval Studies» 25(1963), pp. 26-53, at pp. 31-32.

tutive of mainstream orthodoxy, a dialectic that puts this component in equilibriunm with its opposite. The vector that perpetuates over centuries a heretical idea is seldom a subterranean, forbidden tradition. It is rather a fully open one, orthodoxy itself, within whose canonical texts and practices the idea can potentially be rediscovered at any moment. To simplify, then, Christian bellicism and terror are at home within an orthodox equilibrium whose averaged direction is eirenec\textsuperscript{8}.

The Christian attitude toward war has been oriented historically by a deep theological structure, the understanding of the relationship between Old Testament and New. Early Christians encountered in the Jewish scriptures a bellicose God, the heavenly Lord of Hosts. Some found in the violent tenor of the Old Testament one of the main reasons to reject its books wholesale. This position would have sundered completely Christianity from Judaism, and so endangered the legitimacy of the New Testament itself. After all, the Gospels built upon Jewish scriptural tradition rather than merely proclaimed a charismatic rupture with the past. The solution, firmly in place by the time of Origen of Alexandria (ca. 185 - ca. 254), consisted in a hermeneutical system in which most, if not all, Old Testament events and institutions (labeled «shadows», «types», or «figures») prefigured New Testament realities («truths», «sacraments», or «antitypes»). The first group constituted the «letter» (also called «historia»); the second contained this letter’s «spiritual» or «mystical» sense\textsuperscript{9}. Progressively, this category of «realities» anticipated by Old Testament «types» widened to include Church institutions and events in Church history\textsuperscript{10}. Scholarship distinguishes between two kinds of typologies, disjunctive and connective, according to whether exegesis denies literal exemplarity to the Old Testament or considers that its institutions can be literally replicated in the post-incarnational era\textsuperscript{11}. This distinction was obviously of importance for, and correlated to, the willingness to take the sword for God.

The Church fathers interpreted Old Testament wars overwhelmingly as «wars of the Spirit», so disjunctively: Through typology, they became wars

\textsuperscript{8} For the notion of theological equilibrium, see Philippe Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre: Prince, pouvoir et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible, Beauchesne, Paris 1994, pp. 40-49. No need then to look for some peripheral Gnostic tradition as the Christian ancestor of the Marxist Bolshevik utopia, as does Igal Halfin in an otherwise stimulating book, From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia, U. of Pittsburgh P., Pittsburgh 2000.


\textsuperscript{10} The process is discussed in Johan Chydenius, Medieval institutions and the Old Testament, Societas scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki 1965.

against Satan and vices, and by the fourth century, against heresies. As Origen put it in his *Homilies on the Book of Joshua*, «unless these carnal wars were meant as types of spiritual warfare, the books of Jewish histories would never have been handed down by the Apostles to be read in the churches by the disciples of Christ, Who came to teach peace»\(^\text{12}\). In a representative and exemplary explanation of a key scriptural passage for the spiritualization of warfare, *Ephesians* 6, Jerome (331-420) sets forth that Ancient Israel (*vetus Israel*) fought its wars against the heathen nations to serve as a figure of the combats against the demons waged by the True Israel, *verus Israel* — the Church\(^\text{13}\). Thus the lexicon of war provided, and still provides, Christian images for spiritual regeneration. On the very eve of the American Civil War, preachers of the Third Great Awakening used bellicose Old Testament figures\(^\text{14}\). Stripped of context, the following citation would seem to announce a physical holy war:

«God is only waiting to see us ready for the march. Much territory is yet to be possessed. One strong, united earnest effort to return to God in the spirit of a true consecration, and the voice of God is ready to break out from the mercy-seat, saying: Rise and go forward! Now let my spirit go forth. Let souls be awakened. Let the Jordan be crossed. Let the tall Anakims be slain\(^\text{15}\). Let Christ have his inheritance and my people their millennium»\(^\text{16}\).

Typology could even leave the lexicon of warfare aside. Thus the armed crossing over the Jordan river into the promised land served as one among the many types for the sacrament of baptism\(^\text{17}\). To summarize, then, Old Testament warfare seen «in the spirit» signified either events in Christ’s life,


\(^{13}\) PL 26, col. 545b-546b: «The Apostle seems to be telling us with other words the following: O Ephesians, who you read about the combats of Israel against the pagan nations seems to mean the flesh and the blood, for example, of the Egyptians, Moabites, Ammonites, Idumaeans, and other nations. But if you want to truly know, reckon that “all these things happened to them in figures”. They were written for our sake, we in the direction of whom the ends of time are coursing forth». For Origen, *Ephesians* 6 was also a key text; see G. Caspary, *Politics*, cit., pp. 20-23.


\(^{15}\) *Josh* 11.21-22. The Anakims were the last heathen tribe to have been conquered in the Promised Land.


\(^{17}\) J. Daniélou, *From shadows*, cit., p. 270. Warfare remains present in the sacrament of baptism if only insofar as «sacramentum» also means the soldier’s oath of initiation into the Roman army.
or sacraments that He had instituted, or intense inner wars against vices and their devilish pushers (the «tropological» reading of the biblical letter), or Christ’s bellicose final return at the head of the heavenly armies. We shall consider this last option further down.

The hermeneutics of letter and spirit, shadows and realities encompassed everything – all Scripture, not only Old Testament depictions of wars and of warriors. This entailed conversely that the authority of the Christian exegetical method – and so the identity of the Church in relation to the Synagogue – was intimately tied with the spiritualization of warfare18. The age of the Church, opened up by the New Testament and Christ’s acceptance of the cross (the «New Dispensation»), was characterized by mercy and grace, as opposed to the age of the Old Testament, in which God had manifested Himself as the avenging Lord. A method of interpretation, thus, engendered a bias in favor of pacifism. Repeatedly, the antithesis between Old and New Testament is made an explicit argument for the rejection or demeaning of material warfare19.

But there are limits to this structural bias. Firstly, the spiritualization of war meant simultaneously its constant presence in the lexicon of the churches. It is structurally as well, then, that bellicose images are embedded in Christian culture. Secondly, if theologians spiritualized warfare, they also spiritualized eirenic scriptural passages. So Augustine when he famously and fatefully converted from non-coercion to coercion during the Donatist crisis20. Thirdly, in the pre-modern era at least, peace, pax, did not mean the absence of conflict but victorious conflict leading to right order and justice, iustitia21. Finally, there were at least two ways in which the mode of scriptural interpretation that has just been outlined was inflected or completed. It is to these and to their implications for the legitimacy of violence in the name of God that I now turn.

18 Here I follow G. Caspary, Politics, cit., pp. 9, 125, 127-129.
First, the end of times and its scenarios reintroduced vengeance into history. While theologians routinely divided sacred history in two eras, the Old Dispensation and the New, respectively characterized by vengeance (\textit{vindicta, iustitia}) and mercy (\textit{misericordia}), they might reason according to a ternary partition of time. The age of the Church did follow the Old Testament era, but it itself issued onto a final epoch, the time of the End, crowned by the Last Judgment. These last days, filled with religious upheaval and warfare between good and evil, would be the stage on which a renewed and intensified divine vengeance would play itself out\textsuperscript{22}. Humankind would be mercilessly threshed and winnowed, the wicked going to destruction and the elect to bliss.

Here was a hermeneutic modality through which Old Testament warfare escaped de-materialization: Prophecies of divine wrath over Israel or its enemies pointed both to the historical destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E., and to the war of the very last days announced by Revelations and cognate Gospel texts. And, of course, John's visions referred to this end-game scenario\textsuperscript{23}. In such a ternary scheme, the vengeful God of the Old Dispensation returned anew as the equally vengeful Judge.

Whenever a set of Christians convinced itself that this last age had begun, pitiless warfare could become the order of the day. One sees this reasoning at work, for instance, during the First Crusade of 1095-1100, in 1419-1421 among a radical faction of the Bohemian Hussites, with the Anabaptists of Münster (1534-1535), during the early modern wars of religion, and in the seventeenth-century English Civil War\textsuperscript{24}. One Bohemian profession will

\textsuperscript{22} One sees the duality vengeance-mercy also at work in the deviant model proposed by Joachim of Fiore, \textit{Expositio in Apocalypsim}, 14, Minerva, Venice 1527; repr. Frankfurt 1964, fol. 176rb: «The first order will be more meek and sweeter in order to gather the harvest of God’s elect [...] the other will be more ferocious and fiery to collect the wine-harvest of the reprobate» (Erit ergo ille ordo tanquam mitior et suavior ad colligendas segetes electorum dei velut in spiritu Moysi. Ille vero ferocior et ardentior ad colligendam vindemiam reproborum, acsi in spiritu Helye) – cited by Henri de Lubac, \textit{La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Fiore}, 2 vols., Lethielleux, Paris 1979-1981, p. 51, n. 7.


\textsuperscript{24} The classic narrative weaving together these events remains, despite its defects, Norman Cohn, \textit{The Pursuit of the Millennium}, Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages, 3rd. rev. ed, Oxford 1970.
stand for many others: «[...] one should kill the worshipper of idols and [...] we [should] make our hands holy in the blood of the damned»\(^{25}\). For the Taborites indeed in 1419, an eschatological tipping point had been reached. Like others before and after him, Václav Koranda thought it was now time to exchange the peaceful pilgrim’s garb for that of the warrior of the Lord (or, in another biblical image, from Joel 3.10, to «hammer ploughshares into swords»): «Brethren, know that the vine has blossomed, but that the he-goats want to plunder it; for this reason do not take a staff in hand, but a weapon»\(^{26}\).

Less hurried millennial timelines preserved a space for mercy, while still emphasizing God’s avenging sword. One can read in this vein an American Civil War preacher\(^{27}\):

«The Old Testament [...] has been almost outlawed from human affairs. We have turned its leaves for its curious and quaint old histories, but felt as though we were living under a new dispensation. And now the days have come upon us, for which these strong-chorded elder Scriptures have been waiting. Their representations of God, as the rewarder of the evil doer; the Avenger of the wronged; the Asserter of His own trampled prerogatives [...] suit the day and hour of the intense present».

The presence in Preacher Stone’s sermon of the Old Dispensation in the age opened by Christ is explained (theologically) by another aspect of biblical typological interpretation, partial fulfillment. It too, alongside shrill apocalypticism, maintained violence in History. It too involved eschatology. To illuminate its workings, I turn to twentieth-century liberation theology.

Discussing the nature of eschatology, and in particular the relations between biblical letter and biblical spirit, and between prophecy and prophecy’s fulfillment, Gustavo Gutiérrez criticizes fellow theologians who consider the Old Testament political histories to be inessential. He is here, in effect, in disagreement with modern proponents of the traditional disjunctive typological method\(^{28}\):

«It is a matter of partial fulfillment [of biblical types] through liberating historical events, which are in turn new promises marking the road toward total fulfillment. Christ does not «spiritualize» the eschatological promises; He gives them meaning and fulfillment today [...] but at the same time He opens new perspectives by catapulting history forward, forward towards total reconciliation. The hidden sense [of


Scripture] is not the «spiritual» one, which devalues and even eliminates temporal and earthly realities as obstacles; rather, it is the sense of a fullness which takes on and transforms historical reality. Moreover, it is only in the temporal, earthly, historical event that we can open up to the future of complete fulfillment».

Gutiérrez is not cited here as if he were the twentieth-century key to two thousand years of Christian exegesis. But he testifies to the consequences of a mode of thinking eschatology that was present in the writings of Jerome, in the fourth century, of Carolingian commentators of the Bible, in the ninth, and beyond. These exegetes understood a number of Old Testament stories, read as types or as prophecies, to be not merely promises that have been fulfilled already during Christ’s first coming on earth. They would also be fully accomplished at His return in glory at the End of Times. Incidentally, this interpretive possibility was picked up by the influential Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202), to indicate that Revelations’ prophecy of the thousand-year reign of the saints applied «in part» to the Church after Christ’s Passion but «in fullness» (secundum plenitudinem) to the End of times. Furthermore, and more important to our inquiry, in this partial fulfillment scheme, Old Testament prophecies or types are being accomplished partially in the Church’s present, between the two cardinal hinges of sacred history, incarnational past and Second Coming future. These partial accomplishments constitute simultaneously types for the ultimate fulfillment, at the end of times, of the initial prophecy or type. To cite Bruno of Segni, circa 1100, the institutions of the Synagogue were umbra et figura, foreshadowing and figure; those of the Church are figura et veritas, figure and reality; and those of Heaven are sola veritas, reality sole. Contemporary crusading chroniclers could see in the same manner the Christian conquest of the Holy Land. The mere shadow and figure was vetus Israel’s march to the Promised Land; the actualization as reality was verus Israel’s expedition of 1095-1100; but this reality, the crusade, was simultaneously a figure that pointed to the ultimate winning of the Celestial Jerusalem, the reality sole.

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31 J. Chydenius, Medieval institutions, cit., pp. 19-20, 35-36, 123-126, detects the first delineation of this scheme in Paul’s understanding of circumcision and baptism; it flourishes after the seventh century. For Bruno, see J. Chydenius, loc. cit., p. 126, citing the Sententiae 1.3, pt. 165, col. 882.

Christian groups and nations were frequently tempted by the idea of «particular election» or «manifest destiny». Those who did had a propensity for this partial accomplishment scheme of thinking history. In a sermon delivered on November 21, 1679, on the occasion of a general fast throughout the North American British colonies, William Adams (1650-1685) expressed the hope that some of the Old Testament promises might be fulfilled in part in New England, before the Last Judgment, for the benefit of the New People of the Lord – the Calvinist Pilgrims. His understanding of prophecy places him squarely on a continuum between the medieval mode of thinking just described and Gutiérrez. While Old Testament prophecies pointed specifically to the Last Days (and «full and compleat [sic] accomplishment»), there existed, along with «glorious accomplishments» (notably in Apostolic times), on the road to endtimes what Adams calls, like Jerome twelve hundred years before him, partile accomplishments.

As Gutiérrez spells out, underlining «the significance of the self-generation of man in the historical political struggle», this mode of thinking eschatology favors activism in this world. The stories of Exodus and the struggles of Israel foreshadow not only two exceptional moments but also a plurality of historical moments or even, sometimes, a whole historical process. Here the liberation theologian joins countless contemporary-era divines who thought they could detect God’s will behind the sequence of bloody crises that make the history of the saeculum. Pontificating during the 1898 Spanish-American War, an American minister will stand for many: «Battlefields are the footsteps of the Omnipotent across the centuries». Hegel’s sophisticated the-


34 William Adams, The necessity of the pouring out of the spirit from on high upon a sinning apostatizing people, John Foster, Boston 1679, p. 35, cited by Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, U. of Wisconsin P., Madison 1978, p. 96 (italics in the original): «If it be granted that they [prophecies] do respect a signal dispensation of God to the Jews in the last times, yet that hinders not that there is many a like dispensation of God in accomplishing these promises under the Gospel. Prophetical Scripture is often fulfilled. And though there be in special one grand accomplishment of Scripture[’s] Prophesies and promises; yet there are also many Specimens, beginnings of fulfilling them, partile accomplishments, like dispensations of Gods providence, wherein those prophesies and promises are fulfilled in their measure and degree». I checked Bercovitch’s text against the original.


37 Backing this assertion with the Gospel saying, «Think not that I am come to send peace on earth; I came not to send peace, but a sword» – Rev. William C. Reuter of Wala-Wala,
ory of history was not too different in positing the generative force of violence38. The alternative configuration, the classical, disjunctive typology described earlier, highlights the contours of this model. By claiming the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies and types, it could evacuate Old Testament violence, with as a result the New Testament age being defined as an era of peace. As already said in opening this discussion, this Origenian, disjunctive denial of any literal exemplarity to Old Testament wars was, over the longue durée, the dominant theological position in the Christian churches39.

But the scheme of partial fulfillment constitutes as well a legitimate possibility within Christian hermeneutics. Its potential was actualized several times in the course of Western History. For instance, the battle-songs of American wars, rich in bellicose Old Testament references, have a long past behind them; and their scriptural echoes are much more than metaphor – their coming into being and impact owed much to the contemporary religious fervor and its conviction that the age and its violence constituted a special providential waystation towards endtimes40. Consequently, one cannot

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39 It is material for another paper to discuss to what extent Martin Luther’s Zwei-Reiche-Lehre, which accepts Old Testament typology for a secular government, allows the latter to wage what one might call secularized holy war and expect martyrdom for the Fatherland. See the discussion of the early modern configurations in James Stayer, Anabaptism and the Sword, rev. ed., Coronado Press, Lawrence 1976.
40 Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-1894), To Canaan, Puritan War Song, ed. Edward Summerfield Ninde, The Story of the American Hymn, Abingdon, New York 1921, p. 201: «Where are you going, soldiers, / With banner, gun, and sword? / We are marching South to Canaan / To battle for the Lord! / What Captain leads your armies / Along the rebel coasts? / The Mighty One of Israel, / His name is Lord of Hosts. / To Canaan, to Canaan / The Lord has led us forth / To blow before the heathen walls / The trumpet of the North!», more accessible in the many editions by Frank Moore, Anecdotes; The Poetical Works of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 3 vols., Houghton Mifflin, Cambridge, Mass. 1890, p. 250. Here typology is conjunctive, precisely because of the atmosphere of the American Third Great Awakening. The potential parallel between the conquest of Canaan and the settlement of North America did not necessarily lead early colonists to legitimize cleansing, or so argues Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Settling With The Indians. The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580-1640, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa 1980, pp. 166-168, 188. She adduces two good examples. The Anglican William Crashaw could state in 1610 that «the Israelites had a commandment from God to dwell in Canaan, we have leave to dwell in Virginia: they were commanded to kill the heathen, we are forbidden to kill them, but are commanded to convert them» (A Sermon Preached in London before the right honourable the Lord Lawarre, W. Hall, London 1610, fol. 3r-v, cit. in K.O. Kupperman, p. 167). Robert Cushman from Plymouth colony stated that «Neither is there any land or possession now, like unto the possession which the Jewes had in Canaan, being legally holy and appropriated unto a holy people the seed of Abraham», in William Bradford and Edward Winslow, A Relation or Journall of the English Plantation settled at Plimoth in New England, J. Dawson, London 1622, p. 66, cit. ibi. For these men at least, typology was disjunctive.
dismiss as abnormal deviations from orthodoxy the projection of Old Testament warfare into crusader deeds. Nor should one consider illogical oddities thirteenth-century iconographic depictions of biblical Israelite warriors in the guise of contemporary knights of Christ, sometimes wielding famous Christian holy swords such as Roland’s Durendal. By the same logic, their Philistine enemies effortlessly become «Saracens» or «Muslims». That exegetes also turn around and give allegorical interpretations of such New Dispensation crusading scenes projected back into Old Testament times will – at this point in our exposé – seem equally unsurprising. A quarter century ago, one of the best specialists of the thirteenth-century «Bibles moralisées», Reiner Haussherr, opined that since the images of crusaders that sometimes appear in these illustrated commentaries of the Bible were read allegorically, they were not to be taken as serious references to contemporary holy wars. Christoph Maier has recently countered this view; and one will agree with him against Haussherr. The reading of a crusading scene as allegory constitutes, to the contrary, a profound statement on the spiritual significance of crusading. Holy war and internal Christian struggles belong together; and the present, seemingly material warfare for Christ has spiritual, typological significance. What Maier noticed in passing has been more elaborately developed by Sara Lipton, who underscores how in the Bibles moralisées war versus demons is isomorphous with war versus religious deviance, including contemporary Judaism. The reinvestment into the biblical «letter» or «historia» of the mystical senses (allegory or tropology) that this literal sense grounds is indeed a structural possibility in


44 Sara Lipton, Images of Intolerance: The Representation of Jews and Judaism in the Bible Moralisée, U. of California P., Berkeley 1999. I am grateful to Professor Lipton for e-mail discussions about crusades in the Bibles moralisées, and for her generous references to the places in this genre where crusaders appear.
medieval hermeneutics. For when one is interpreting in the register of a given sense of scriptures, one has not necessarily left, and excluded, the other interpretive registers. If we apply this to the topic of religious coercion, the medieval exegete or preacher is not necessarily dealing exclusively either with military warfare against Philistines or Muslims, with warfare within the soul or for society’s morality, with warfare against demons, or with dogmatic warfare against pagans, heretics, and post-biblical Jews. All these enemies can be simultaneously meant.

There are two corollaries to this mutual presence of spiritual, non-physical, and physical, but spiritual, warfare. Firstly, warfare that so shimmers on the threshold between literal and spiritual constitutes a historical event that points to the ultimate redemption at the end of times. Secondly, this sort of warfare also demands a regeneration that must begin at home – both within Christendom and within the individual crusader.

The second corollary accounts for a very longue durée correlation in western History between violence, including war, and moral reform. The first corollary explains why, for the clerical elites and their secular heirs, violence is always embedded in a teleological sacred history, and why it announces something about the course, nature, and speed of this sacred history. To illustrate this, one can turn again to modern America.

«The regeneration of the North is the great central jewel which Jehovah has set on the bosom of the age», wrote in 1866 the Baptist minister George Ide, to frame his interpretation of the just concluded American Civil War. In this struggle, the forces of the Union were prefigured by Ancient Israel, which had been saved from Pharaoh’s hosts and then moved on to conquer Canaan. The war with its sufferings was literally a purgation, moral and political, including from the sins of slavery in which the North had participated. It was also world-historical, to use that amusing German term. «The scene so sublimely pictured by prophecy – the great battle of Armageddon – is now enacting [itself] on our globe». Trained militarily and morally, the American elect and their allies could take the Gospel and liberty onward to the «conquest of the world». One could almost announce, said Ide, that: «the grand, crowning Epoch, to which all the Past has pointed, and for which all the Past has been, IS CONSUMMATED FOREVER!». The European may smile or smirk at this American hyperbole, but this hyperbole was once quite European.

46 George Ide, Battle echoes: or, lessons from the war, Gould and Lincoln, Boston 1866, pp. 27, 78. Numerous similar ideas during 1861-1865 reported by H. Stout, Upon the Altar, cit., passim.
47 Ibi, pp. 93-95.
48 Ibi, p. 28.
49 Ibi, pp. 306, 103 (emphasis in the original).
Let us now turn to the second corollary, the correlation between violence and moral reform. A fine-grained knowledge of exegesis and its workings does not simply help to understand how holy war was conceivable in a seemingly pacifist culture. It goes some way into accounting for the contours that violence took in the West, even beyond the pre-modern and early modern eras. This claim is borne out by a comparison between the medieval crusades and the French Revolution, this ideological breakthrough that Ernst Bloch, in 1921, dubbed «a supreme Christian event»⁵⁰.

An analogous cultural logic presided over the two historical moments⁵¹. The crusades could not be simply a foreign war. They were fought, indeed, on behalf of an entity, the ecclesia, whose clerical elites sermonized about an enemy consisting in a polymorphous league of all members of Antichrist, and as a facet of a reform movement that had plural targets⁵². Historically, the ecclesia had been persecuted sequentially by Jews, pagans, tyrants, heretics, and bad Christians (also called false brethren, falsi fratres). But the last age of history compounded all these successive onslaughts into a single conspiracy. The ecclesia, then, expected to fight simultaneously political oppression by kings and powerful laity, outer religious enemies, and inner dissent – be it dogmatic (heresy) or moral (depravation in all social orders)⁵³.


⁵¹ Conjunctures and contexts should not be dismissed, but an approach that recognizes the semi-autonomous force of ideology accounts for features of violence, in particular its inability to be easily contained, that cannot be otherwise explained. See Jean-Clément Martin, *Violence et Révolution. Essai sur la naissance d’un mythe national*, Seuil, Paris 2006.


No wonder, for instance, that pope Gregory VII offered remission of sins both to warriors who might be willing to die in fighting versus the Turks or Christian schismatics, and to laity who helped expel from their church a perjured and adulterous provost, so as to reform the institution. Furthermore, in the age of reform, war could not be merely material. Institutional or military struggle went hand in hand with warfare within the inner man. As already said, this conjunction was made possible by the interplay between the historical, allegorical, and tropological (or moral) senses of Scripture. Literal struggles, sometimes prophesized by Old Testament or even New Testament passages, pointed to institutional and moral meanings, and in turn were colored by these ecclesiological and ethical senses. Finally, ideologically seen, Christian expansion was justified by a universalism that could only be led by a pure elite – we meet here the motif of the vanguard, present in the First Crusade, the French Revolution, and the Soviet experience. The elitism is most visible in eschatological moments, but is detectable within the eschatological component of any theology or ideology. In a vision, if authentic datable to 1098, Saint Andrew told the poor Provençal peasant Peter Bartholomew that the crusaders were God’s elect, «superior in merits and in grace to all the men who came before you and will come after you». But this source and others welcomed the dreadful decimation of the pilgrims’ armies on the road to Jerusalem: it was a purification that weeded out the bad, sown by Satan, from the chosen few.

While fearsome, the multifarious onslaught of Antichrist’s agents was productive. To cite an in-passing, but fully representative, comment by the mid-twelfth century Cluniac abbot Peter the Venerable:

\[\text{erade the other, as was the case, for example, with the fourth crusade preacher and curate Fulk of Neuilly.} \]


55 See here Jay Rubenstein’s analysis of a first crusade narrative in his Guibert of Nogent: Portrait of a Medieval Mind, Routledge, New York 2002. Carl Erdmann, Origins of the Idea of Crusade, E. tr. Princeton U.P., Princeton 1977, p. 203, remarks on Gregory VII that «his usage of the [expression] \text{military service of Christ} was sometimes literal, sometimes metaphorical; and, occasionally, the meaning was left unclear [...] This wavering between literal and metaphorical meanings characterizes the expressions drawn from military life». No wonder – the pope shuffled between the mystical sense and a literal sense of \text{militia Christi}, and saw them on a continuum.


57 For this, see P. Buc, \text{La vengeance de Dieu}, cit., and Id., Martyrdom in the West: \text{vengeance, purge, salvation and History}, forthcoming in Niels Holger Petersen et al. (eds.), \text{Enduring Reflections: Histories of Metamorphosis}, Brepols, Turnhout 2008.
«But just as the persecutions of external enemies always enlarge Holy Church, so do the temptations [she suffers] from false brethren purge her ever more. With the Holy Spirit’s help, then, the Church will enlarge rather than shrink; she will be purged rather than stained»58.

By the later Middle Ages and the onset of the early modern era, inner and outer enemies were so easily conflated that one’s Christian opponents were labeled routinely «inner Turks»59. Paintings of apostolic-age Jerusalem depict the Holy City crowned with minarets and crescents; in many Passion scenes Jewish executioners have been replaced by Muslims60. The ultra-Catholic Parisian curate Simon Vigor, in a 1571 sermon preached in Notre-Dame de Paris to celebrate the battle of Lepanto, could thus state that the defeat of the Turks was a victory against the heretics61. Inversely, the white crosses worn by the Catholic gangs roaming through Paris during the 1572 Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacres referred to the crusade and to Michael the Archangel62. Immediately after the slaughter, Pope Gregory XIII issued a bull of indulgence inviting the Parisians to gather in processions to give thanks to God and the Virgin for the king’s triumph over heresy and to implore them for victory over the Turks63. The pope’s conflation was fully traditional. Many a medieval plan of purification of a kingdom from heresy culminated on a final crusade against the Muslims and the recovery of Jerusalem. In the sixteenth century too religious purification encompassed what we would call socio-political reform. The ultra Catholic sermons which prepared Parisian opinion for August 24, 1572 also called for a re-ordering of the kingdom64. This link-

62 Denis Crouzet, Guerriers, cit., pp. 95-96. 
63 Denis Crouzet, La nuit de la Saint-Barthélémy, un rêve perdu de la Renaissance, Fayard, Paris 1994, p. 265. 
64 Artus Désiré, L’origine et la source de tous les maux de ce monde [...], Paris 1571, cit. by D. Crouzet, Guerriers, cit., pp. 92-93; Simon Vigor, summarized by B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, cit., pp. 153-158.
age between reform and holy war was not only Catholic. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Fifth Monarchy men could imagine a fully reformed and socially revolutionized England going on to conquer Rome after having taken over for the true religion the Netherlands and France.65

The Revolutionary ideological constellation that crystallized during the Terreur of 1793-1794 was analogous in its linkages. First, one finds then also the idea of a universal conspiracy that necessitates purges. By 1792, Robespierre – and here I cite Carol Blum’s fine book – «had explained the basic conceptual framework of the Terror: in the beginning, he said, “the nation divided into two parties, the royalists and the defenders of the people’s cause”. After destroying the royalists, however, the so-called patriots divided “into [...] two classes”: the “bad citizens” and the “men of good faith”. This antithetical pattern marked Robespierre’s discourse until Thermidor. Each purification left France still divided between the pure citizens and the wicked ones, the latter ever disguising themselves under new masks.66

There was a logic to this, a quasi-Satanic logic. The seeming success of the good against one type of persecutor led the Devil to reshape, and redouble his efforts. One should never fall asleep, Bertrand Barère thundered, in the face of such an enemy: «C’est aux bons citoyens à veiller plus que jamais à ne pas s’endormir au sein des victoires et à porter la terreur dans l’âme des conspirateurs qui semblent se multiplier à mesure que les armes sont victorieuses»68.

By the time of the Terreur, the French revolutionaries inveighed against a league of the «enemies from the outside» and the «enemies from the inside». The foreign and civil wars were co-essential. The king could not be a citizen; as king, he was outside the social contract and had to be treated like a foreign enemy. Symmetrically, when captured on the battlefield, soldiers in the service of those foreign tyrants who opposed to the Revolution would be meted out the death penalty like conspiratorial French monarchists or other factieux. The erstwhile rules of war, which since at least 1648 had spared from slaughter captive enemy combatants, were thus superceded.69

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In the revolutionary era, warfare also meant reform. Terror marched with virtue, a famous pairing which also meant that the violent purgation and regeneration of France was unthinkable without a reconstruction of the French individual self – especially that of the revolutionary leaders. «Mœurs had to be regenerated», for otherwise the State would be only «errors, pride, passions, factions, ambition, cupidity», and these «vices [would] necessarily lead back to tyranny». Envoys from Paris paired political and moral purgation: «It should not be enough for you to have expelled from your midst men whom the Fatherland considers suspect; you must, further, extirpate from all hearts the seed of those passions which are noxious to the public good». The sense that France’s enemy was one, and protean in its works, now striking in the guise of a French moderate, now in that of a French extremist, now from the inside, now from the outside, now with tyranny’s swords and bayonets, now by sowing vices in the body politic – the polymorph essence of counter-revolutionary perversity would have been at home in the age of the Crusades and ecclesiastical reform.

If inner enemies, including not only «suspects» but also vices, worked mysteriously together with foreign powers, conversely, success against the one could impact the other. In this optic, for some revolutionaries, foreign war looked like a fortunate boon. It would allow «regeneration in blood». The ultra-Catholic and counter-revolutionary Joseph de Maistre could only make sense of this (to him monstrous) blood sacrificial culture by accepting it as a fact and making it the diabolical antithesis to an equally sacrificial Christianity and monarchy destined to triumph dialectically.

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71 «Il ne suffit pas d’avoir repoussé de votre sein des hommes suspects à la patrie: il faut encore extirper de tous les coeurs le germe des passions qui nuisent au bien public»; Brest, 10 nov. 1793, Aux officiers de la marine de la République, in François-Alphonse Aulard (ed.), Recueil des actes du comité de salut public, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris 1889-, vol. 2, p. 368 n. 3. A common conjunction of material and spiritual warfare, see the texts adduced in W. Kruse, Erfindung, cit., pp. 257-263.
Incidentally, in its gentler forms of coercion, the Revolution also harkened back to medieval justifications. Thus the Abbé Grégoire – a cleric – echoed an ecclesiastical discourse initiated by Augustine of Hippo. For the North African father, it was necessary to constrain heretics to listen to Catholic sermons in order to integrate them into the *ecclesia*. Left to their own devices, with perverted hearts and minds, fettered by the bonds of custom, they could not see the truth. Legislation, echoed the Abbé, would compel the Jews to become citizens; «reason» would «recover its rights».

The anti-monarchist exaltation of «liberty» belonged, alongside regeneration, virtue, and righteous violence, to the core of Jacobin ideology. Liberty, alongside purification and Holy War, had formed a similar constellation around 1095. «Libertas ecclesiae» meant the immunity of the Church, its property, offices, and office-holders, from the domination of the laity. Reformers branded those laymen who persisted in exercising traditional rights «tyranni», tyrants. The most visible tyrants of all were the princes and kings who favored the sale of offices and sacraments – the heresy of simony – and did not act against married clergy. So tyranny was connected to moral turpitude and heresy; heresy and paganism were fellow-travelers; and paganism went hand-in-hand with tyranny. In the following centuries, political liberty, religious purity, and holy war came together. In its fabulous oddity, a myth of origins floated to public opinion in 1500 brings this home: The Swiss confederation, settlers who had immigrated to the Alps from Sweden, defeated in 387 with «knightly deed» a pagan tyrant named Eugenius. As a reward, they received their by 1500 famous liberty. The commonplace that medieval revolts never aimed at the institution of kingship, but at incumbent kings, is true. But in their polemics, eleventh-century reformers came very close to eighteenth-century revolutionaries, as when Gregory VII dismissed kingship as an institution initially invented by «men ignorant of God [...] who dared to seek domination over their equals, meaning, human beings, at the Devil’s instigation». The three decades between 1070 and 1100 were a historical moment that conjoined three rare extremisms – an ecclesiastical purge, a holy war, and an attack on the foundations of kingship. While not

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74 Augustine, Ep. 93 to Vincentius 1.3, ed. A. Goldbacher (CSEL 34,2), F. Tempsky, Prague-Vienna-Leipzig 1898, p. 448: «(...) the teaching of salvation (doctrina salutaris) is joined to a useful terror, so that both the light of truth may dispel the darkness of error and the might of fear (vis timoris) may break off the shackles of evil habit (...)».


often reproduced, this moment obeyed an inner cultural logic: The linkage of
the three was embedded in the conceptions of the Devil’s works and of how
God’s elects had to counter them. In this sense one can agree with Eugen
Rosenstock-Huessy, who in 1931 proposed that this moment should be seen
to have been the «first [European] revolution»79.

It is only, then, out of ignorance of the very longue durée of Catholic
culture that one can dismiss its contributions to Revolutionary culture. I
cite Frank Tallett’s otherwise fine article, Robespierre and Religion80: «[...]
although the language that Robespierre adopted when talking of his God
was drawn eclectically from the stock of vocabulary used by Christians
since the early seventeenth century, there was nothing that was Christian
left in his narrow vision of an implacable and unforgiving deity, who
presided over a Manichaean universe divided between upholders and oppo-
nents of the Revolution». But as this article has argued, orthodox
Christianity had transported within itself, from its very beginning, the
Manichean formula, balancing it with more eirenic counter-formulas. The
War of the Last Days is the moment when this formula expresses itself
without compensation, Manichaeism then becomes very Christian.
«Implacable and unforgiving» – these epithets fit precisely the work of
God and His elects in visions of the End.

ABSTRACT

A fine-grained knowledge of the theology of war and of sacred history as
they emerged during the formative centuries of Christian thought allows one
to see why violence for God is allowed and called for in the supposedly paci-
fic age opened by Christ’s Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection. These
exegetical formulas, and the logic of exegesis, also make sense of the ideo-
logical similitudes between two European revolutions, on the one hand the
Reform of the eleventh century, combining crusade, purgation of the Church,
and fight for libertas ecclesiae, and on the other the French Revolution bet-
ween 1789-1794, and its constellation of simultaneously civil and foreign
war, regeneration of the nation and of the self, and fight for political liberty.
Such constellations lasted well beyond the putative break represented by
Modernity and the equally putative secularization process.

Una conoscenza ravvicinata della teologia della guerra e della storia
sacra nel loro emergere durante i secoli di formazione del pensiero cristia-

79 I refer to the second revised edition, Die europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter
der Nationen, Europa Verlag, Zürich and Vienna 1951; his ideas are accessible in English in
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution. Autobiography of Western Man, W. Morrow,
New York 1938.

80 Frank Tallett, Robespierre and Religion, in Colin Haydon-William Doyle (eds.),
no permette di rendersi conto del perché la violenza per Dio sia permessa e
invocata nell’epoca, che si supponeva pacifica, aperta dall’Incarnazione,
Passione e Resurrezione di Cristo. Tali formule esegetiche e la logica dell’e-
segesi danno ragione delle somiglianze ideologiche fra due rivoluzioni euro-
pee: da un lato la Riforma dell’undecimo secolo, che combina crociata,
purificazione della Chiesa e lotta per la libertas ecclesiae, dall’altro la
Rivoluzione Francese fra 1789 e 1794, con la sua costellazione di guerre al
contempo civili e esterne, rigenerazione della nazione e del sé e lotta per la
libertà politica. Tali costellazioni sono durate ben al di là della presunta
frattura rappresentata dalla Modernità e dell’ugualmente presunto processo
di secolarizzazione.